Currently, Argentina is experiencing what the government describes as a "great depression." Using the "Great Depressions" methodology developed by Cole and Ohanian (1999) and Kehoe and Prescott (2002) , we find that the primary determinants of both the boom in Argentina in the 1990s and the subsequent depression were changes in productivity, rather than changes in factor inputs. The timing of events links the boom to the currency-board-like Convertibility Plan and the crisis to its collapse. To gain credibility, the Argentine government took measures to make abandoning the plan more costly. Because the government was unable to enforce fiscal discipline, however, these increased costs failed to make the plan more credible and instead made the crisis far worse when it failed.
Introduction
Currently, Argentina is experiencing what the government describes as a "great depression."
The economy of Argentina finds itself submerged in a great depression that, even if it began four years ago, deepened after mid 2001 with average quarterly falls of deseasonalized GDP with respect to the previous quarter of 5 percent for the last two quarters of 2001 and the first of 2002. This violent deepening of the recession occurred just at the moment that economic agents, almost universally, became convinced of the impossibility of sustaining the Convertibility Plan.
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The currency-board-like Convertibility Plan that the Argentine government had adopted in 1991 was spectacularly successful in reducing inflation. Many commentators argue that, by fixing the value of the Argentine peso to the U. S. dollar, however, this plan resulted in an "overvaluation" of the peso. According to this popular theory, this We economists will need to wait for the dust to clear from the economic wreckage in Argentina and for better data to become available to draw any firm conclusions about the causes of the current great depression there. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to start to analyze the depression and to hypothesize about its causes. This paper does so using the "Great Depressions" methodology developed by Cole and Ohanian (1999) and Kehoe and Prescott (2002) . This methodology employs growth accounting to decompose changes in economic growth rates into the parts due to capital accumulation and inputs of labor and the part due to the efficiency with which factors are used, measured as total factor productivity (TFP). The methodology also employs a simple dynamic, applied general equilibrium model, based on the neoclassical growth model, to account for the fluctuations in factor inputs that are induced by changes in TFP.
In the numerical experiments of a model of Argentina presented in this paper, we find fluctuations in TFP, rather than changes in factor inputs, that were the primary determinant of both the boom in Argentina in 1991-1998 and the current depression.
The "Great Depressions" methodology is a diagnostic tool that indicates what issues need to be studied further. Perhaps not surprisingly, this methodology indicates that, when searching for causes of the boom and depression in Argentina, we should examine government policies connected with the Convertibility Plan. The results of our analysis also impose some discipline on our search: A successful theory of the recent fluctuations in Argentina needs to have the crucial link be between government policy and TFP rather than between government policy and investment or between government policy and employment. This paper proposes an alternative to the theory that an "overvaluation" of the Argentine peso after the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1998 produced unsustainable trade deficits and led to the crisis. This alternative theory is based on time consistency and the difficulty of enforcing fiscal discipline: In an effort to make the Convertibility Plan more credible, the Argentine administration took measures throughout the 1990s that made abandoning the plan very costly. Neither the second Menem administration nor the de la Rúa administration was able to enforce fiscal discipline, however. The desperate measures taken during 2001 to keep the Convertibility Plan in place, especially the corralito that restricted depositors' access to bank accounts, imposed tremendous costs on the economy. Yet these measures did not save the Convertibility Plan. Rather, the costs associated with these measures, particularly those incurred by the domestic financial system, made the crisis far worse when the Convertibility Plan failed.
The Great Depressions Methodology
Studying depressions using the neoclassical growth model is a relatively new methodology. Cole and Ohanian (1999) first applied the growth model to study the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States. This successful application led to the study of depressions across the world using this method, including Kydland and Zarazaga's (2002) 
Prescott.
The great depressions methodology focuses on the growth of a country's real GDP per working-age person relative to a trend. We concentrate on GDP per workingage person instead of the more common per-capita measure since it is consistent with our theoretical economy in which the entire working-age population is capable of working.
We choose to count those aged 15-64 as the working-age population.
The analysis employs a Cobb-Douglas specification of the aggregate technology,
where t K is the capital stock at time t , t L is hours worked, and t A is TFP. When TFP grows at a constant rate (that is, when TFP is
), the neoclassical growth model implies a unique balanced growth path in which output and capital per worker grow at the same constant rate, 1 g − . It is relative to this trend growth rate that we measure a country's performance. Kehoe and Prescott (2002) argue that this trend growth represents the world stock of useable production knowledge growing smoothly over time and that this knowledge is not country specific. They define the trend growth rate to be 2 percent per year, corresponding to the growth rate of GDP per working-age person for the United States over the period 1900-2000. Kehoe and Prescott (2002) consider the United States to be the best choice because it is a large, relatively stable country, and it is the current industrial leader. As shown in Figure 1 , the 2-percent trend in GDP per working-age person fits the United States data very well, with the only major deviations from trend being the Great Depression, 1929 -1940 , and the World War II buildup, 1940 -1946 . In comparison to these major deviations, business cycle fluctuations are trivial. (Details on sources of the data are provided in Appendix A.)
The stock of world production knowledge is common across countries, but countries differ in their institutional structures. This implies that, even though all countries on a balanced growth path grow at the same rate, each country is on its own growth path. These paths differ in their levels of output per capita. Countries with institutions that encourage efficiency grow on a path with higher output per capita than countries with institutions that encourage rent seeking or other activities that lower efficiency. The institutions that determine these paths include competition policy, bankruptcy systems, and the legal system. The aspects of these institutions that affect neither labor input nor the accumulation of capital are captured in TFP. Changing institutions change the path of TFP, moving a country to a new balanced growth path.
One of the central premises of the neoclassical depression methodology is that explaining movements in TFP involves identifying the changing institutions. Notice that between 1932 and 1974, however, Argentina grew on the 2-percent growth path, with relatively minor business cycle fluctuations. Starting in 1974, Argentina entered a great depression as defined by Kehoe and Prescott (2002) . Kehoe and Prescott (2002) consider two characteristics important in defining a great depression. First, the deviation from trend of output per working-age person must be large, and, second, this deviation must occur quickly. Their definition of a great depression is motivated by U.S. experience during [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] . As shown in Figure 1 , real output per working-age person fell by more than 37 percent compared to the 2-percent growth trend between 1929 and 1933. As late as 1938, it was still almost 29 percent below trend.
Although it started more slowly than the U.S. Great Depression, the [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] great depression in Argentina lasted longer and resulted in a larger deviation in output from potential as measured by the 2-percent growth path. 
Growth Accounting
To evaluate the contributions of different factors to the changes in output per working-age person, we set up an accounting framework based on the neoclassical growth model. Using the Cobb-Douglas function (1), we calculate TFP as the residual after accounting for capital and labor,
Given series for Y t and L t , we need to choose a value for α and to generate a series for 
where T is a fixed amount of land, 0.30
, and 0.10
In neither case does the qualitative nature of our conclusions change.
To calculate a capital stock series, we cumulate investment, I t , using (1 )
for the depreciation rate δ = 0 05
. and an initial condition on capital. Maia and Nicholson (2001) Meloni (1999) and Kydland and Zarazaga (2002) we are able to construct series of output and investment going back to 1918. We impose the somewhat arbitrary initial condition that the capital stock in 1918 be such that the capital-output ratio grew at the same rate as it did over 1919-1928.
Given our choice of α and the generated series for t K , we can calculate a TFP series. Taking natural logarithms of the production function, we follow Hayashi and Prescott (2002) in rearranging terms to obtain 1 log log log log 1 1
where N t is the number of working-age persons. The first term on the right-hand side of this equation is the contribution to output of TFP, the second is the contribution of the capital-output ratio, and the third is the contribution of hours worked per working-age person. On a balanced growth path, output per worker and capital per worker grow at the same rate, and the capital-output ratio and hours worked per working-age person are constant. On such a path, our growth accounting would attribute all growth to changes in TFP. In our growth accounting, therefore, changes in the second two terms measure the contributions of deviations from balanced-growth behavior: changes in the investment rate and changes in hours worked per person. Table 1 presents the growth accounting for Argentina during the periods 1990-1998 and 1998- 
Applied General Equilibrium Model
Although growth accounting indicates that most of the changes in output in
Argentina over the period 1970-2002 were due to changes in TFP, the contributions of changes in the capital-output ratio and of changes in hours worked per working-age person were not negligible. How much of these changes can we account for as equilibrium responses to the observed productivity shocks in a growth model?
To answer this question, we calibrate a simple applied general equilibrium model, based on the neoclassical growth model, of a closed economy in which consumers have perfect foresight over the sequence of TFP shocks. The representative consumer maximizes the utility function
subject to the budget constraint in each period, 1 ( )
and an initial condition on capital, 1970 K . Here t C is consumption, h is the number of hours available, taken to be 100 hours per week, 52 weeks per year for working-age persons, and ( ) t t hN L − is leisure. In addition, r t and w t are the marginal products of the production function with respect to K t and L t .
Given the production technology that we have used for growth accounting, the feasibility constraints for this model are
(1 )
, 0
Here we include government spending and net exports in consumption. To run numerical experiments, we need to calibrate values for the parameters β and γ in the consumer's utility function. Using the first-order conditions for the maximization problem of the representative consumer in our model economy, we obtain
Using the data for the period 1950-1970, we estimate 0.9445
The second column in Table 1 There are a number of reasons why our model may predict more volatile swings in hours worked and investment than in the data. The assumption of perfect foresight, for example, may be too strong. Notice, for example, that the model has the downturn in the investment rate associated with the current depression start in 1998, rather than in 1999 as in the data. A model with uncertainty and rational expectations would tend to produce a less volatile path for investment than that in Figure 7 , and a smoother capital accumulation would tend to induce a smoother labor input than that in Figure 5 .
Rigidities in the Argentine labor market, on the other hand, may have caused hours worked to fluctuate less than in the frictionless labor market in our model, causing hours worked to fluctuate less than in Figure 5 . These are obviously topics that need to be studied more.
To show that introducing frictions into the model can result in far more accurate results, we introduce the simplest possible friction into capital accumulation. The third and fourth columns in Table 1 and the second columns of graphs in Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 report the results of numerical experiments in which there are constant-returns-to-scale adjustment costs of the capital stock as in Lucas and Prescott (1971) :
where
The model without adjustment costs corresponds to 1 η = .
Somewhat arbitrarily, we set 0.9 η = , as in Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000) . Since capital accumulation is now governed by equation (14), rather than by equation (4), we need to recalculate our capital stock series and our TFP series. The third column of Table 1 reports the growth accounting. The calibration of γ stays the same, and we recalibrate 0.9544
The results of the numerical experiment are reported in the fourth column in Table 1 and the second column of graphs in Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Notice that the primary determinant of changes in GDP is still changes in TFP. As King and Rebelo (1999) have noted, putting rigidities into a dynamic general equilibrium model does not diminish the role played by TFP shocks.
The model now does a more accurate job of accounting for fluctuations in Argentina. Notice, in particular, that the smoother investment series in Figure 7 , which is the direct result of the adjustment costs, induces a smoother series for hours worked in Figure 5 . There are still significant deviations of the model's results from the data that are worth studying. Hours worked in Argentina during the boom of 1990-1998 actually fell, for example, rather than rose as in the model. We obviously need to identify the factors that caused this sort of deviation between the data and the model's predictions.
We also need to do a better job in specifying and calibrating the frictions that we impose either in the labor market or in capital accumulation. Nevertheless, examining the results of our numerical experiments in Table 1 in Argentina, we need to be able to explain the performance of TFP.
Explaining TFP
It should be stressed that the "Great Depressions" methodology does not always find that changes in TFP growth drive changes in economic growth - Conesa and Kehoe (2003) , for example, find that changes in hours worked have driven the economic slowdown in Spain over the period 1975-2000. As Kehoe and Prescott (2002) conclude, however, changes in TFP are the most common determinants of great depressions. In attempting to account for cross-country levels of output per capita, Prescott (1998) also concludes that only TFP can account for these differences, and not capital or labor inputs.
Consequently, we need to understand TFP to explain both the cross-country distribution of per capita output, and the large movements of output within a specific country.
Prescott (1998) calls for a theory of TFP and outlines a theory that involves a country's resistance to the adoption of more efficient technologies.
While there is no broadly accepted theory of TFP, a country's institutions likely play a large role in the evolution of its TFP. Institutions that may be important include a country's openness to foreign competition, the strength of monopoly rights, the prevalence of labor unions, government regulation of industry, and price controls. To understand the boom of the 1990s and the depression that started in 1998 in Argentina, we need to identify changes in the institutional structure that took place around the beginning of the boom and the beginning of the depression. We do not need to go too far in searching for obvious candidates. In 1991, the Argentine government introduced the Convertibility Plan to reduce inflation. And, as the quote from the Argentine government reported in the introduction makes clear, the timing of the current depression identifies it with the collapse of this policy.
In the next section, we return to the situation in Argentina. At this point, however, we note that the finding that changes in government policy are the primary causes of economic booms and depressions is consistent with the findings in the Kehoe- 
What Happened to TFP in Argentina?
The analysis of the previous sections leaves us with the challenge of identifying the policy changes that led to the fluctuations in TFP depicted in Although the Convertibility Plan was successful in reducing inflation, it suffered from credibility problems as evidenced by occasional spikes in interest rates. Figure 9 shows significant spikes in interest rates on peso denominated deposits in 1992 and 1993, during the early days of the Convertibility Plan, in 1995, during the Tequila Crisis, and starting in late 2000. These spikes can be ascribed to fears on the part of investors that the Convertibility Plan would be abandoned and the peso would be devalued. Starting in 1994, interest rates on dollar denominated deposits also had spikes during the same periods. These spikes can be ascribed to fears that any abandonment of the Convertibility Plan would be accompanied by some sort of collapse of the domestic financial system associated with drastic changes in government policies. Later events have proved these fears justified.
2 Hyperinflation and subsequent deflation make graphing the inflation rate in Figure 8 
Foreign Trade
The Brazilian devaluation in 1998 did not lead to problems for the Argentine current account -both exports and the trade surplus in fact grew, except for a mild downward blip in 1999. Direction of trade statistics show that an increase in exports to the United States more than compensated for the decline in exports to Brazil. Argentine exports are primarily agricultural products, especially beef and wheat, whose prices are determined on world markets. The sharp change in Argentina's terms of trade with Brazil undoubtedly hurt some specific industries, such as the automobile parts industry.
It is conceivable that these negative impacts had significant macroeconomic spillovers.
Nonetheless, Figure 10 shows that no theory that places the blame for the crisis on a drop in the trade balance can match the data.
What is even more striking about the data depicted in Figure 10 
Foreign Investment
Foreign investment probably played a significant role in both the 1990s boom and the current crisis. The current crisis can be thought of as an example of what Calvo, Izquierdo, and Telvi (2002) call a "sudden stop" -a situation where foreign investment, which has mostly poured into the nontraded goods sector, suddenly stops and Argentines are asked to start to repay their debts. As a country with a small traded goods sector and many rigidities that impede the mobility of factors across sectors, Argentina is finding this adjustment very painful. Figure 11 , which compares data on foreign direct investment in Argentina with those in Chile, illustrates the challenge that construction of any such model along these lines will face. At the same time that Argentina was faced with its sudden stop, Chile was hit with an even larger one, yet did not fall into a similar crisis.
Lack of Fiscal Discipline
The proposed hypothesis is that the Argentine crisis was triggered by a lack of While Krueger (2002) puts forward arguments and some data to support this hypothesis, more work on the data needs to be done. Figure 12 , for example, based on official Argentine data, shows a small and declining federal government deficit prior to the crisis. Figure 13 , based on data put together by the International Monetary Fund and presented by Krueger, includes provincial finances and off budget items. It depicts a far direr situation.
As Da Rocha, Giménez, and Lores (2002) stress, abandoning the Convertibility Plan has had a disastrous effect on Argentina's government finances. The real devaluation that has followed has made the value of government debt, most of which is denominated in dollars, shoot up, as seen in Figure 14 . Unless there is a substantial real appreciation, Argentina will find the burden of this debt crushing.
Evidence of a lack of consensus in Argentina is easy to find. In the summer of 2001 when Cavallo pushed a Zero Deficit Law through Congress to restrict government spending, the provinces and even other departments of the federal government reacted by issuing their own quasi-monies to make up for funds they would not be able to receive. Significantly, the value of the Patacón depicted in Figure 15 , one peso, is lower than that of any paper currency.
Lessons for Models of Monetary Policy
Perhaps the most important challenges in the design of monetary policy involve trying to overcome dynamic consistency problems. The Argentine experience provides us with at least four important lessons.
Real Exchange Rates and Domestic Relative Prices
The "New Open Economy Macroeconomics" stresses price rigidities and pricing to market in constructing mechanisms through which monetary policy affects real exchange rates. See Betts and Devereux (2000) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) for carefully worked out models. This approach, at least as it has been developed so far, provides no role for the relative price of nontraded goods to traded goods within a country. This approach has been supported by empirical work by Engel (1999) , which finds little or no relation between real exchange rate fluctuations and fluctuations in the relative price of nontraded goods. It is doubtful that this approach will be useful in modeling events in Argentina, however. Figure 16 shows the wild fluctuations in the real exchange rate between Argentina's currency and the U.S. dollar and the fluctuations in the portion of this real exchange rate due to changes in the relative price of nontraded goods. Here CPIs are used to measure overall price levels, and PPIs are used to measure traded goods prices (see Betts and Kehoe 2003 for details) . Changes in the relative price of nontraded goods, even measured as crudely as they are in Figure 16 , account for more than 50 percent of real exchange rate fluctuations.
A promising direction for modeling real exchange rate fluctuations in Argentina is given by Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000), who relate real exchange rate fluctuations to changes in the relative price of nontraded goods and to changes in foreign investment. Monetary policy seems to have played a crucial role in driving foreign investment in Argentina, but not through the mechanisms stressed by the New Open Economy Macroeconomics.
Commitment and the Costs of Reneging
Increasing the costs of abandoning a policy can reduce the set of conditions under which a crisis can occur. If these increased costs do not rule out a crisis completely, however, they can backfire in making the economy far worse off if things do go wrong. Kehoe (1996, 2000) stress this point in a calibrated general equilibrium model of Mexico's 1994-1995 financial crisis. In studying the boom in the 1990s in Argentina and the subsequent collapse, we will have to carefully examine government policies that accompanied the Convertibility Plan as part of the overall stabilization policy.
Particularly important policies include the massive privatization, especially in the banking system, and liberalization of the financial system in general. Significantly, these policies allowed the Argentine economy to become "semi-dollarized." See de la Torre et al. (2002) for an analysis of the real costs incurred by abandoning the Convertibility Plan.
"Conservative" Central Bankers Rogoff's (1985) (and, more recently, Woodford's 2002) proposal to reduce the dynamic consistency problem in monetary policy making is to employ a "conservative" 
The Political Economy of Monetary Policy
Dynamic consistency problems are pervasive because commitment is not easy.
Lack of political consensus both within the federal government and between the federal and the provincial governments in Argentina made it impossible to resolve fiscal imbalances. In this environment, "unpleasant monetarist" arithmetic doomed the Convertibility Plan to failure. Measures that the administration had put in place to make the Convertibility Plan more credible are imposing severe costs on the economy now that the plan has failed. 
A Final Note
They say that every dark cloud has a silver lining, but it is hard to have much Recent data from Argentina show a modest turnaround in quarterly GDP growth and a more significant exchange rate appreciation. The political situation is uncertain, but there is some hope that the economic depression is bottoming out. What is more certain is that, as more data become available, Argentina will provide an important and fascinating case study for economic researchers to study.
Appendix A: Data Sources
The data used in this paper are available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~tkehoe/.
Details on the sources of the data are provided below.
National Income and Product
Argentina's national income and product account data for the years are from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
The components of gross domestic product (private consumption, government consumption, investment, imports and exports) were deflated by the gross domestic product deflator. Data on real GDP 1950 GDP -1970 GDP and on investment 1918 GDP -1970 are from Kydland and Zarazaga (2002) , which are originally sourced from Meloni (1999) . to the data for total population to obtain a series for hours worked. This series is spliced with data from Kydland and Zarazaga (2002 ) for 1950 -1973 , which were constructed using data from Elías (1992) and from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
Government Finances
The quarterly data on government revenue and expenditures for Argentina are from the Secretaría de Hacienda's web site (http://www.mecon.gov.ar/onp/html). These data cover total revenue and total expenditure for the federal government. The quarterly data that serve as the denominator in Figure 12 are from the IFS. The data depicted in Figure 13 are meant to be more comprehensive. They are from Krueger (2002) . 
External Debt and Foreign Direct Investment

Prices
The data on Argentina's consumer and producer price indices and the nominal exchange rate are from the IFS. The monthly interest rate series are the money market rate for peso deposits and the money market rate for foreign currency deposits from the IFS. the estimation of β is the after-tax return on capital. This is a possibility worth exploring.
The most important thing to notice about the results of the numerical experiments reported in Table 2 is how similar they are to those reported in Table 1 . The growth accounting decomposition in equation (5) leads us to expect that in the model with the low labor share more of economic fluctuation will be ascribed to changes in the capitaloutput ratio and less to changes in TFP. Changing α implies that the TFP series also changes, however. In fact, the results in Table 2 show that the new TFP series is far more volatile than the old one and that even more of the movement in output is ascribed to it. Nevertheless, the model still does a good job of matching the data, particularly when we introduce capital adjustment costs. Table 3 presents the results of models in which there is a fixed factor, land, that earns 10 percent of GDP. This is a reasonable upper bound on the economic importance of land given that agriculture and mining only account for about 10 percent of GDP in Argentina: land earns a return in other sectors, but labor and capital also earn returns in agriculture and mining. Because there is a fixed factor, the only balanced growth paths are ones in which there is no growth. Accordingly, we calculate the equilibria summarized in Table 3 by requiring that TFP growth and population growth after 2010 converge to zero and that the equilibrium converge to a zero growth steady state by 2035.
Calibrating the model without adjustment costs, we find that 0.9445
, as in the model without land, and that 0.2977
In the model with adjustment costs, 0.9445 
